This article analyses the role of the European Council in two key legislative packages on economic and budgetary coordination, the SixPack and the Two-Pack, which were negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure. It assesses how and to what extent the key actor in the literature on the new intergovernmentalism -the European Council -2 is able to curb the powers of the supranational institutions -the Commission and the European Parliament -in a policy area where the community method has been applied since the Treaty of Lisbon. It tracks the development of the legislative negotiations -from the stages preceding the Commission's proposal to their conclusions, relying on official documents, press reports and 30 original interviews with key decision-makers. The strong role of the European Council both as an agenda-setter and in the legislative negotiations stands out, and suggests that the implications of new intergovernmentalism may well extend beyond intergovernmental decision-making processes.
Introduction
"As a result of this trend towards 'summitization', the fixation with meetings at which the heads of state and government, in a clear breach of the spirit of the Treaties, take more and more decisions themselves and seek to put their stamp even on the fine print of legislation, the Community institutions are increasingly being marginalized". This is how the President of the European Parliament (EP), Martin Schulz, portrayed decision-making in the European Union (EU).
i The academic literature has captured a similar development and, especially but not exclusively, in the field of economic and financial policies, has described the European
Council as "the political executive of the Union" (Fabbrini 2013 (Fabbrini , 1006 ). In the "new" formulation of "intergovernmentalism", the European Council is the "centre of political gravity" of the EU (Puetter 2014, Ch. 3) .
As the financial and economic crisis broke out in 2009, the issue of reforming the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) featured prominently in the EU agenda. In a context dominated by the Heads of State and government (hereafter, 'the Heads'), the 'intergovernmental' method became the dominant mode of decision-making, while the 'community' method -where the Commission sets the agenda and the EP is on a par with the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP)
-was marginalized. In the post-Maastricht era (Bickerton et al. 2015a) and, specifically, in the context of the Eurocrisis (Fabbrini 2013; , the
Heads have further institutionalized their coordination in Brussels. They have pooled their powers in the policy areas that are crucially linked to state sovereignty, rather than sharing sovereignty with supranational institutions. In doing so, they no longer limit their role to the definition of the broad political strategy for the Union, but they also engage directly with crucial legislative choices.
This article draws on the literature on the 'new intergovernmentalism'
and, presenting an in-depth analysis of the reform of the EU economic governance, aims to make two main contributions. First, the new intergovernmentalism is generally presented as a decision-making mode alternative to the community method (Bickerton et al. 2015a ). Yet, in one of the intergovernmental policy areas par excellence -macro-economic and budgetary coordination -the Treaty of Lisbon enhanced the role of the EP to that of co-legislator (art. 121.6 TFEU), thus formally strengthening the community method. At present, however, the literature has only speculated on the impact of new intergovernmentalism on the community method and its institutions (i.e., Puetter 2014, 228-35) . In this study, we argue that the European Council has a strong grip over the decision-making process, even when the OLP applies, at least, in budgetary policies.
Second, we speculate on the mechanisms through which the European
Council is able to give direction and influence the development of the legislative negotiations between the Council and the EP. We take issue with one of the main controversies dividing new intergovernmentalism and its critics: namely, that the propositions advanced by the new intergovernmentalists are too general to be empirically tested (Bickerton et al. 2015b; Schimmelfenning, 2015) . We specify the mechanisms through which the European Council influences the legislative process, from the stage of agenda-setting through to the unfolding of the negotiations. Our argument is that the European Council has both the institutional resources and political legitimacy to frame the policy agenda and constantly remind the co-legislators and the European Commission what its preferences and priorities are.
Our arguments are assessed on the cases of the Six-Pack and the TwoPack, the two key legislative packages that reshaped, under OLP, the EU's economic governance as the economic and financial crisis hit the Union.
We track the development of the legislative negotiations from the period preceding the legislative proposal of the European Commission to the conclusion of the negotiations, keeping our analytical focus on the role of the European Council. The analysis is based on official documents of the institutions, articles in the specialized press and statements of politicians.
Crucially, we complement the documentary evidence with 30 original interviews with key players from all of the EU institutions involved either in the design of the proposals or in the negotiations leading to their adoption.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the new intergovernmentalism and its implications for the EU political system. Section three presents the mechanisms through which the European Council is expected to influence the legislative process. Section four develops an analytical narrative on the unfolding of the negotiations of the Six-pack and the Two-pack. The concluding section discusses the main findings and their validity beyond the cases that are analysed here.
The Rise of New Intergovernmentalism
When the financial crisis spread to Europe and markets started to demand increasingly higher interest rates from several European countries with high debts and/or deficits, the EU reacted in two main ways. First, it quickly established assistance mechanisms to help countries experiencing severe financing problems and created new rules to make the coordination of national economic/fiscal policies stricter. In this process of (re)defining the EU's system of economic governance, the key actors were the intergovernmental institutions of the EU: the European Council, the Euro-summits, the ECOFIN Council and the Euro-group. As Fabbrini (2013 Fabbrini ( , 1004 argues, the "extremely complex system of economic governance set up during the euro crisis" has been fundamentally "decided through and within the intergovernmental institutional framework".
Yet, these intergovernmental developments are seen as parts of larger trends in European integration. More specifically, the Maastricht Treaty is said to have formalized two different decision-making systems. On the one hand, the single market continues to be governed by the community method. On the other hand, as new policy areas (i.e., foreign policy, migration, financial cooperation) were added to the remit of the EU, they were largely directed by the intergovernmental institutions (Bickerton et al. 2015a) . The "integration paradox" (Puetter 2014) consists in the recognition that integration is needed in key areas of state activity, but supranational institutions are granted a secondary, if not marginal, role.
The Lisbon Treaty has institutionalized this dual decision-making logic for different policy regimes (Fabbrini 2015) . As Schimmelfenning notes (2015, 6) , the policies that best suit the integration dynamics that are described by the new intergovernmentalism are in "core state powers" (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013) -that is, areas where integration entails high sovereignty and identity costs for the member states. This is the case of economic and budgetary cooperation, of which the European Council quickly established itself as the 'gouvernement economique' (Fabbrini 2013 "strengthened the supranational side of the EU" (Fabbrini 2013 (Fabbrini , 1016 .
However, "the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure in successive treaty revisions does not eo ipso signal more supranationalism" (Bickerton et al. 2015b, 733) . Expounding on this insight, we argue that the supranational institutions failed to act according to the roles traditionally identified by the community method.
We hypothesize that both institutions are significantly constrained by the activism of the European Council. The latter has both the institutional resources and political legitimacy to frame the policy agenda, thus entering into a domain that the treaties (art. 17 TEU) reserved to the European Commission. It also has the leverage to instruct or influence the actors that are directly involved in the negotiations, thus informally exceeding the letter of the Treaty of Lisbon: "the European Council shall not exercise legislative functions" (art. 15(1) TEU).
The Long Shadow of the European Council on the Legislative Process

Agenda-setting
From the establishment of the EC, the Heads (meeting in the European
Council since the early 1970s) have set the general direction to the process of integration, taking landmark decisions on its future from treaty reform to enlargement (i.e., Bulmer and Wessels 1987 ). Germany and its Northern allies (Fabbrini 2013; . In any case, whatever the trigger, when the Heads set the agenda and establish the normative framework, the Commission can be expected to not only act strategically and "avoid putting forward proposals that stand little chance of success" (Bickerton et al. 2015a, 713 ) but also to follow suit the impulse and recommendations of the European Council.
Decision-making Process
The European Council can also intervene during the policy-making process itself. On the one hand, the policy content of an issueintroduced in the policy process and framed by the Heads -can be considerably changed by the EU's co-legislators. On the other hand, the policy process can be considerably slowed down by the same institutions 
Legislating on Economic Governance
In order to assess these arguments, this paper tracks the unfolding of the There has been wide speculation about the "unfriendly rivalry" (Interview H) between these two actors, both keen to strengthen their institutional power via agenda control (see also Laffan and Schlosser 2015, 2-3). On the one hand, some officials report that "people are aware that it was Van Rompuy that was first. It was not a cut and paste but [the Commission] took a lot of elements" of the Task Force report (Interview L; also Interviews H and S). On the other hand, officials in the Commission replied that, due to its large and highly specialized administration, most of the ideas were originated in the Commission. In this perspective, the Task Force was not much more than an effective sounding board for the plans that the Commission had conceived (Interview G).
A few points can be clarified at this stage. The vote in the EP was contested. In particular, the two files that reformed the SGP were approved with a tight majority consisting of the EPP and ALDE. Among other aspects, they stressed the need to "be responsible". As an interviewee put it, "you don't want to go into a The political weight of the European Council was needed to take authoritative decisions to effectively calm down the markets. While the Commission was putting forward its legislative proposals on the TwoPack, the Heads were concluding the negotiations on the Fiscal Compact.
In such a scenario, the Commission refused to be marginalized and reacted by producing the legislative proposals "at record speed" The EP saw its legislative position limited. If it played almost no part in the agenda-setting of the two packages, the impact it had during the policyprocess on their final outputs was minor. It took a back seat and operated in a 'responsible' way, de facto accepting that the legislation was predominantly cooked elsewhere. The Heads urged MEPs to approve the deals and respect the deadlines. Yet, this is a practice that they usually pursue in salient legislative dossiers and does not seem a peculiar feature of the Six-pack or the Two-pack. As to the threat of going intergovernmental, it is fair to say that it was never concrete, although it was in the mind of many participants. People in the EP felt that, if the parties did not reach an agreement, the (European) Council would secure stricter budgetary surveillance though intergovernmental means (Interviews P and S) .
If the analysis of the Six-pack and the Two-pack provides considerable evidence that the European Council was able to substantively shape the legislative process, even in the OLP, three caveats apply. First, the SixPack and the Two-pack were negotiated in a moment of acute crisis, where the very existence of the Union was at stake. Whether the European Council will continue to shape, to such an extent, the policy process in a more 'normal' Union remains open to future assessment.
Indeed, serious threats to the survival of national political systems (e.g., wars or major economic crisis) similarly tend to empower the core executives, while 'normal' politics may resume when the crisis is over or becomes less existential (Owens and Pelizzo 2010, 1) . Second, there is a significant exception to the intergovernmental story: the role of the ECB.
The ECB offered valuable and influential advice in the elaboration of the policy content of the two packages. It had an important role in the Task ii While two of the dossiers were not formally under codecision, the six files were all negotiated together as a package (see Héritier et al. 2015, 64-66 This is, obviously, not always the case. For instance, in the negotiations for a Financial Transaction Tax, the first proposal of the Commission was opposed by some members of the Council and had to be withdrawn.
